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Failure to Protect Witnesses: Are Prosecutors
Liable?
The duty of everyone to aid in the enforcement of the law, which is as
old as history, begets an answering duty on the part of government,
under the circumstances of contemporary life, reasonably to protect those
who have come to its assistance in this manner.'
When third persons injure witnesses due to the witnesses'
unfavorable testimony, the witnesses have a limited number of
theories available to sue prosecutors who have unreasonably re-
fused to provide them with police protection. Because there are
no federal statutes imposing a duty upon prosecutors to offer
protection to witnesses, and in the absence of a relevant state
statute, plaintiffs must seek a judicial remedy under the four-
teenth amendment of the United States Constitution. The general
rule courts follow, however, is that prosecutors'have no constitu-
tional duty to provide police protection to witnesses threatened
by outside forces regarding their testimony. Nonetheless, a court
may find prosecutors liable under a narrow exception to the gen-
eral rule, when a "special relationship" exists between the prosecu-
tor and witness. Unfortunately, many courts, recognizing the deli-
cate balance at issue between persons seeking redress for viola-
tions of their constitutional rights and ensuring that government
employees are allowed to perform their duties unhindered by a
profusion of lawsuits, have balanced their decisions heavily in
favor of the government employees.2 Although egregious fact
patterns should arise where the court would strike the balance in
favor of the injured witness, such a case has yet to emerge.-
In the context of the United States Constitution and federal
statutory law, this Note traces the history of the "no constitutional
duty" rule and "special relationship" doctrine to its present status.
Part I explores the inception of the no-duty rule and the elements
1 Schuster v. New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958)..
2 Rosen, The Bivens Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled Promise, 67 N.C.L. REV. 337,
338 (1089).
3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently considered
arguably such a case. See Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1987). See also infra
note 63 and accompanying text.
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of a plaintiffs case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Part I addresses three
main issues. First, has there been state action? Second, if there
was state action, was there a constitutional deprivation? Finally, if
there was as constitutional deprivation, what is the requisite sci-
enter to hold a government official responsible? Although it
would be convenient to treat the issues in this order, the courts
have inextricably commingled these issues to a point that they are
a single oversized inquiry. Part II examines the special relation-
ship exception to the no-duty rule. Part III explores both econom-
ic and policy reasons for and against retaining the no-duty rule.
Part IV analyzes the Supreme Court's position on special relation-
ship doctrine. Finally, Part V concludes that constitutional claims
brought against prosecutors for an unreasonable failure to pro-
vide endangered witnesses with police protection from third par-
ties will continue to be unsuccessful.
I. GENERAL RULE: THE GOVERNMENT HAS No AFFIRMATIVE DUTY
To PROTECT WITNESSES
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871' creates a feder-
al cause of action against state officials who have deprived private
citizens of either their constitutional or federal statutory rights.
No federal statute, however, imposes either a duty on state prose-
cutors to provide endangered witnesses with proper protection
from third persons or a basis for liability when a prosecutor negli-
gently, recklessly, or intentionally fails to do so. Injured witness-
es5 bringing section 1983 claims are limited to alleging that a
state prosecutor 6 42 U.S.C. deprived them of their fourteenth
4 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the Dis-
trict of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Colum-
bia.
Id.
5 The term "injured witnesses" in this Note refers to witnesses, or witnesses repre-
sented by their estates, who have suffered bodily injury or mental distress.
6 In 1961, the United States Supreme Court ruled that individuals deprived of
their constitutional rights by state officials may recover damages under § 1983. See Mon-
roe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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amendment rights.7 When bringing a deprivation of rights claim
under the fourteenth amendment, a plaintiff must first show that
there was "state action."The state action requirement has prov-
en to be a formidable obstacle for plaintiffs alleging deprivation
of their fourteenth amendment rights, especially when the claim
rests on the basis of a state's inaction.'
A. The State Action Issue
In Martinez v. California,"° the United States Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed a California Court of Appeals judgment
holding that state officials' decision to release a prisoner was ac-
don by the State, but the prisoner's commission of a violent
crime five months later could not fairly be characterized as state
action." Focusing on the time span between the prisoner's re-
lease and the commission of the murder, the Court found the
decedent's death "too remote a consequence of the parole
officers' action to hold them responsible .... "12
Two years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit applied the Martinez decision in Bowers v.
DeVito,'3 where an Indiana state mental hospital released a pa-
dent with a known history of criminal violence. One year after
being released, the former patient murdered Marguerite Bowers.
Bowers' estate filed a section 1983 claim against the hospital,
alleging reckless deprivation of her fourteenth amendment
rights.14 The Seventh Circuit held that the government's failure
to affirmatively protect Bowers did not constitute state action, but
limited its holding to situations where the state had not taken an
active role in placing an individual in a position of danger.1 5
Specifically, the court noted:
7 The fourteenth amendment provides that "[n]o State shall . . . deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1.
8 The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment applies only where the
state has "acted" in a manner sufficient to render it amenable to suit. Id.
9 See, e.g., Note, Actionable Inaction: Section 1983 Liability for Failure to Act, 53 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1048 (1986).
10 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
11 Id. at 284-85.
12 Id. at 285.
13 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982).
14 Id. at 619.
15 Id. at 618.
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We do not want to pretend that the line between action and
inaction, between inflicting and failing to prevent the infliction
of harm, is clearer than it is. If the state puts a man in a posi-
tion of danger from private persons and then fails to protect
him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely pas-
sive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him
into a snake pit."
The issues framed by the Seventh Circuit proved to be prophetic
of questions asked by courts treating similar claims: What is the
line between action and inaction? When has the state placed a
person in a position of danger? When must a state protect a per-
son?
B. Government Officials' Requisite Scienter
The issue of whether state officials should be held liable for
their failure to affirmatively act in order to prevent the depriva-
tion of a certain individual's constitutional rights has been fervent-
ly percolating in the circuit courts. 7 One main consideration of
the circuit courts has been the requisite scienter necessary to hold
a state official responsible for an unconstitutional .deprivation of
an individual's fourteenth amendment rights.'8  In Parratt v.
Taylor,19 the Supreme Court of the United States that section
1983 contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that
necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional
right.2" In Daniels v. Williams2', the Court reaffirmed this con-
clusion and noted that the plaintiff would still have to allege a
16 Id. The Seventh Circuit later acknowledged that § 1983 liability will not lie where
an individual voluntarily assumes a position of danger. According to the court, "[tihe
state must protect those it throws into snake pits, but the state need not guarantee that
volunteer snake charmers will not be bitten." Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 511 (7th
Cir. 1986). Although no court has considered whether a witness volunteering testimony
has assumed a position of danger, Congress has made findings of its own. See infra note
76 and accompanying text.
17 See infra note 18.
18 See, e.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1219 (7th Cir. 1988)(en bane)
(gross negligence is not a sufficient basis for liability), cet. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338
(1989); Metzger v. Osheck, 841 F.2d 518, 520 n.1 (3d Cir. 1988) (gross negligence is a
sufficient basis for liability); Washington v. District of Columbia, 802 F.2d 1478, 1481
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (recklessness is not a sufficient basis for liability); Bass v. Jackson, 790
F.2d 260, 262-63 (2d Cir. 1986) (recklessness is a sufficient basis for liability); Jackson v.
Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 1986) (reserving the issue).
19 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
20 Id. at 534-35.
21 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
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state-of-mind sufficient to state a claim that the defendant violated
the underlying constitutional right.22 The Court in Daniels con-
cluded that a state official can not be held liable for negligently
failing to prevent unconstitutional deprivations under the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause.23 The Court recognized
that the Constitution forbids intentional, unauthorized depriva-
tions, but the Court left open the issue of whether gross negli-
gence or recklessness would be sufficient to create a cause of
action under section 1983.24 For this reason, plaintiffs must be
sensitive to the manner in which they frame their complaints, as
the circuit courts differ in their analysis of the scienter issue.
25
C. The Unconstitutional Deprivation Issue
In addition to the issues of state action and scienter, circuit
courts have inconsistently determined when the failure of a state
official to provide an individual with protective services violates
that individual's substantive'due process rights.26 Thus, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services.27 In DeShaney, a case best described
as one of state "inaction," a mother brought suit on behalf of her
minor son under section 1983 against the Winnebago County De-
•partment of Social Services ("DSS") alleging that DSS employees
failed to protect the child from his father after receiving extensive
evidence indicating that his father was physically abusing him.
28
22 Id. at 330.
23 Id. at 336. See also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986).
24 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334 n.3. See also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of
Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1004 (1989).
25 See supra note 18.
26 See Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1219-23 & n.10 (7th Cir. 1988) (en
banc) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989).
27 109 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1989).
28 The DSS first learned of Joshua DeShaney in January 1982, when Joshua's
father's second wife complained that he had hit the three-year-old boy causing marks. A
year later, Joshua was admitted to a local hospital with multiple bruises and abrasion§.
Again, the DSS was notified. A Wisconsin juvenile court placed Joshua in the custody of
the hospital, where he was thoroughly examined and rel~ased back to the DeShaneys
three days later under an agreement that the father was to enter a counseling program.
About a month later, the hospital again treated Joshua for "suspicious" injuries. Over the
next six months, a DSS caseworker made monthly visits to Joshua's home, during which
'the worker observed a number of "suspicious" injuries on his head. The caseworker only
recorded these incidents in her files. In November 1983, the emergency room notified
DSS that Joshua had been treated once again for injuries that appeared to be caused by
child abuse. Still, the DSS took no action. In March 1984, Randy DeShaney beat four-
1991]
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The complaint alleged that DSS employees had deprived her child
of liberty without due process of law in violation of his fourteenth
amendment rights.2 9 The Supreme Court rejected the claim,
holding:
Nothing in the language of the due process clause itself re-
quires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its
citizens against invasion by private actors. The Clause is
phrased as a limitation ... [forbidding] the State itself from
depriving individuals of life, liberty, or property without "due
process of law," but its language cannot fairly be extended to
impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that
those interests do not come to harm through other means. Its
purpose was to protect the people from the State, not to en-
sure that the State protected them from each other.
3 0
The Court arguably could have stopped its analysis here because
the fourteenth amendment requires state action. According to the
Court, the state's temporary custody of Joshua did not render it a
"Cpermanent guarantor" of Joshua's safety. 1 Once the DSS re-
leased Joshua, the Court concluded, the state placed him in a
position no worse than he would have been had the state not
acted at all. Thus, the DSS's subsequent failure to continue to pro-
tect the child could not be constitutionally redressable.32 Since
the plaintiff did not show that there was state action after the
DSS released Joshua, the Court should have dismissed the case
under Martinez.
Nonetheless, the Court did not dismiss the case and instead
examined the scienter issue. Noting that the claim invoked the
substantive rather than procedural component of the due process
clause, the Court concluded that a state's negligent failure to
protect an individual against private violence simply does not con-
stitute a violation of that clause. 3 The Court seemed to imply
that a state official's state-of-mind is irrelevant in a substantive
due process analysis absent some type of "special relationship."
3 4
year-old Joshua so severely that he subsequently suffered brain damage such that he is
expected to spend the rest of his life confined to an institution for the profoundly re-
tarded. Id. at 1001.
29 Id. at 1002.
30 Id. at 1003.
31 Id. at 1006.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 1004.
34 See id. at 1006. According to the Court, "[t]he affirmative duty to protect arises
not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of
[Vol. 66:1111
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II. THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION
Courts uniformly agree that an exception- to the no affirma-
tive duty rule applies where a "special relationship" exists between
the State and a specific individual."5 The special relationship con-
cept often employed in section 1983 cases is derived directly from
the common law of torts. Just as tort law does not recognize a
general affirmative duty to aid others unless a special relationship
exists, courts applying section 1983 do not 'recognize a general
government duty to provide protective services absent a special
relationship. 6 Yet, courts have been reluctant to find special rela-
tionships in section 1983 cases involving constitutional claims.
3 7
A. Influence of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
Perhaps one reason courts have hesitated to engage in a spe-
cial relationship analysis derives from the Restatement (Second) of
Torts approach to special relationships. 38 The Restatement pro-
vides: "One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily
takes the custody of another under circumstances such as to de-
prive the other of his normal opportunities for protection is un-
der a similar duty to the other." 9 The Restatement principle of
special relationships revolves around custodial relationships be-
tween the parties. Although courts generally have recognized that
the Restatement approach is not intended to be exclusive, 40 they
intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act
on his own behalf." Id. (emphasis added). -
35 30 PROOF OF FACTS 2D Governmental Entity's Liability for Failure to Prevent Crime §
4 (1982).
36 See, e.g., Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
37 See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
38 RESTATEMENT (SEc6ND) OF TORTS § 314A(4)(1965).
39 Id. The institute expresses no opinion as to whethr there may be other relations
that impose a similar duty. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965), which discusses when an individual who under-
takes to render services to another may in some circumstances be held liable for doing
so in a negligent fashion. This duty, commonly known as the "Good Samaritan Rule" is
beyond the scope of this Note, as it would necessarily involve a prosecutor undertaking
an initial affirmative attempt to protect the witness.
40 See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 561 F. Supp. 1129, 1134 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("Com-
ment b states, 'the duties stated in this Section arise out of special relations between the
parties, which create a special responsibility, and take the case out of the general rule.
The relations listed are not intended to be exclusive, and are not necessarily the only
ones in which a duty of affirmative action for the aid or protection of another may be
found.'") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314(A) comment b (1965)).
a ]
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have nevertheless declined to expand upon the Restatement prin-
ciple that a special relationship exists where there is a custodial relation-
ship.41 In other words, absent a custodial relationship, courts
generally decline to apply special relationship doctrine. Federal
courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, have
not promulgated guidelines to follow in section 1983 special rela-
tionship cases
42
B. The Custodial Relationship Issue
In Bowers v. DeVito, the Seventh Circuit was willing to find a
special relationship in a case not involving a custodial relation-
ship, as long as the government had actively placed the individual
in a position of danger.43 Nonetheless, the notion that a custodi-
al relationship should serve as a prerequisite to finding a special
relationship has proven a more deeply imbued idea than sup-
posed by the Bowers court.4 4
The concept that a custodial relationship is a necessary pre-
requisite to the finding of a special relationship may have derived
from cases where the court found that the state has an affirmative
duty of care and protection with respect to incarcerated prisoners.
The eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, applicable to the states by incorporation through the
fourteenth amendment due process clause, may require a state to
take affirmative steps to provide protection to a specific individu-
al.45 Cases seem to turn on whether states have deprived individ-
41 See, e.g., DeShaney v Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. CL 998,
1006-07 (1989).
42 Cf Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Toil, 36 YALE LJ. 1, 39-40 (1926-27):
It is not open to doubt that notwithstanding the denial by many courts that the
maxim, "the king can do no wrong," has any application in the United States, it
has nevertheless furnished the real explanation why exemption of the govern-
ment, state and federal, from liability in tort has become an apparent axiom of
American law.
Although Borchard was addressing the issue of sovereign immunity, his observation
may arguably overlap into the area of special relationships. Perhaps courts fear that a
"tidal wave" of litigation would result from expansion of special relationship doctrine in
the area of government employees vis-a-vis private individuals. See infra text accompany-
ing note 84.
43 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
44 See infra text accompanying note 58.
45 See, e.g., Stokes v. Delcambre, 712 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1983)(jailers owe constitu-
tional duty to protect prisoners against harm from other prisoners). See also Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), where the Supreme Court held that prison officials could
be held liable in a section 1983 action for displaying "deliberate indifference" to the
[Vol. 66:1111
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uals of their liberty so that they are no longer in a position to
care for themselves. 46 The courts have effectively interpreted this
deprivation to mean incarceration.
4
C. Special Relationships Other Than Custodial Relationships
One court has found that a constitutional right to protection
based on the fourteenth amendment "and corollary duty may arise
out of special custodial or other relationships created or assumed by
the state in respect of particular persons."48 The problem is that
courts have avoided delineating what factors comprise those "oth-
er relationships" that would give rise to a constitutional right of
protection. Courts have escaped the issue in several ways. First,
complainants may fail to allege in their claim that a special rela-
tionship existed, and thus the court finds it unnecessary to define
the type of "special relationship required to give rise to a
right ... to affirmative protection ....
Second, along with the courts' recognition that a special rela-
tionship between a state and an individual may exist in certain
undefined circumstances, they have even more readily recognized
that the issue may be avoided by finding that the law at the time
of the alleged deprivation was not "clearly established." For exam-
ple, in Jensen v. Conrad" the Richland County Department of So-
cial Services was sued for failure to take action in two potential
child abuse cases. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit avoided the alleged special relationship issue by
noting that under Harlow v. Fitzgerald51 government officials can-
not be held liable if the law52 at the time of the alleged wrong-
serious medical needs of prisoners in violation of the eighth amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. Mere negligent or inadvertent failure to provide
adequate care is not sufficient to state a claim. Id. at 104-05.
46 See, e.g., Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04 ("it is but just that the public be required to
care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for
himself") (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 191 N.C. 487, 490, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (1926)).
47 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1005
(1989).
48 Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84, 88 (4th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
49 Id. at 88. The decedent's estate failed to claim that a special relationship existed
between the state and her.
50 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985). See also Barbera
v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1987).
51 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
52 The term "law" as used here refers to the issue of special relationships.
1991) 1119
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doing was not "clearly established.""3 Since the children died in
1979 and 1980, and the issue of whether the state owed specific
individuals an affirmative duty of protection under the fourteenth
amendment did not arise until after 1980,"4 the defendants
could not possibly have foreseen that a special relationship exist-
ed. For this reason, the court in Jensen concluded that even if a
special relationship did exist under current law, all defendants
were entitled to "a good faith immunity defense under section
1983.""5 The "clearly established" principle set forth in Harlow
and followed in Jensen may well have set the trend for cases in-
volving potential special relationships.56
Although several courts have suggested factors that may indi-
cate the existence of a special relationship, there stands only a
nebulous framework upon which to build. Some suggested factors
include: foreseeability of harm to the claimant; the perpetrator's
status as an agent of the state; the state's declared intention to
protect a certain class of individuals; and reliance by an individual
on implied or express promises of protection by the state.
57
Even though the Jensen court did not address the proposed spe-
cial relationship argument, it did set forth three factors it would
deem helpful when deciding a case.5" Not surprisingly, the first
53 Jensen, 747 F.2d at 194.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 194-95. According to the court,
Given the absence of specific guidelines to determine precisely what constitutes
a "special relationship" and the particularly "close" nature of the factual cases
before us, we would be hard pressed to conclude that the law as it affected the
defendants was "clearly established." We conclude, therefore, that we need not
decide whether, under the circumstances of this case, the State had created or
assumed a "special relationship" with the Clark and Brown families. All of the
defendants were entitled to a good faith immunity defense against liability un-
der section 1983.
id
56 See infra text accompanying note 68.
57 See Note, supra note 9, at 1051.
58 Jensen, 747 F.2d at 194 n.11. The Fourth Circuit found
no need to provide a comprehensive definition of "special relationship" given
the facts of these cases, we note that these cases underscore some of the fac-
tors that should be included in a "special relationship" analysis. These fac-
tors-which would make these cases particularly close ones were we to decide
them-include: 1) Whether the victim or the perpetrator was in legal custody at
the time of the incident, or had been in legal custody prior to the inci-
dent . . . . 2) Whether the state has expressly stated its desire to provide affir-
mative protection to a particular class or specific individuals . . . . 3) Whether
the State knew of the claimants' plight.
1120 [Vol. 66:1111
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factor the court articulated was whether a custodial relationship
existed between the state and the victim or between the state and
the perpetrator.
D. Special Relationship Doctrine and the Bivens Action
Since Section 1983 applies to state officials who have in-
fringed upon an individual's constitutional rights, plaintiffs with a
similar cause of action against a federal official must bring a corol-
lary cause of action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.59 In Bivens, the Supreme
Court ruled that absent a statutory provision providing a course
of redress, individuals whose constitutional rights are infringed
upon by a federal employee could sile directly under the Consti-
tution.60 This means that the aggrieved party must be a victim of
some constitutional deprivation. Because no federal statute pro-
vides for a cause of action when a federal prosecutor refuses to
provide protection to a witness,6 injured witnesses are forced to
file their claims in the form of a Bivens constitutional tort. 2
Id.
59 403 U.S. 388 (1971). For a thorough discussion of the Bivens corollary cause of
action to § 1983, see Rosen, supra note 2.
60 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
61 The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat.
1248 (1982) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1500-15 (1988)) provides no indepen-
dent private right of action against the federal government; nor does Chapter 224, Pro-
tection of Witnesses, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2153, 2154 (1984) (codified as amend-
ed at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3521-28 (1988)), specifically § 3521(a)(3), which provides: "The United
States and its officers and employees shall not be subject to any civil liability on account
of any decision to provide or not to provide protection under this chapter." Id.
62 An action brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-
80 (1988), may overlap with the principles that underlie a Bivens action. Nonetheless,
actions under the FTCA are limited to those in which the United States government has
consented to being sued. Id. § 2674; see also id. § 2680(a), which provides:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply
to (a) Any claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion in-
volved be abused.
Consequently, the decision to place someone in the Witness Protection Program is
a policy decision shielded by the discretionary function exception. Bergmann v. United
States, 689 F.2d 789 (8th Cir. 1974).
A federal witness may bring a suit under the FTCA, § 1346(b), alleging that the
government negligently failed to provide adequate protection if the government had
undertaken to protect the individual and has done so negligently or if a duty. to protect
exists under state law. Leonard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 623 n.35. (2d Cir.), ceit.
1991]
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Federal courts deciding cases after Bivens have echoed the
reasoning applied by courts deciding section 1983 cases. For exam-
ple, in Barbera v. Smith6' the United States Attorney's Office for
the Southern District of New York was investigating the bankrupt-
cy of Candor Diamond Corporation (Candor) for possible fraud
committed by it, by its president, Irwin Margolies, and by its em-
ployees. The investigation was led by Assistant United States At-
torney Stephen Schlessinger. The government eventually secured
the cooperation of Lena Margaret Barbera, an accountant who
served as Candor's comptroller and was believed to have knowl-
edge of the company's suspected fraudulent acts. In exchange for
her cooperation, Barbera was permitted to plead guilty to a sin-
gle-count information charging her with fraud without recommen-
dation with respect to her sentence. Barbera, fearing that her
cooperation would place her life in danger, asked Schlessinger to
provide her police protection. Schlessinger refused. In a later
conversation with Margolies' attorney, Henry Oestericher,
Schlessinger allegedly mentioned that Barbera and another wom-
an, also employed by Candor, were cooperating with the govern-
ment. Oestericher allegedly passed this information on to
Margolies, who hired Donald Nash, a contract killer, to murder
Barbera and the other employee, presumably Jenny Soo Chin.
Shortly thereafter, Chin, a former Candor employee and a close
friend of Barbera, disappeared. Although her body was never
found, Nash apparently displayed a photograph of Chin's dead
body to Margolies as proof that he had carried out part of their
agreement. Soon after Chin's disappearance, Barbera again re-
quested police protection. Again, Schlessinger denied the request.
On April 12, 1982, Barbera was abducted from the rooftop park-
ing area at Pier 92 in Manhattan and was later shot to death.
Three employees of CBS Inc. were also killed when they attempt-
ed to come to her aid. Margolies and Nash were eventually con-
victed for Barbera's murder in a New York state court.
64
The Second Circuit found that the Barbera estate's complaint
alleging that the AUSA negligently deprived her of her right to
life in violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment
failed to state a constitutional claim. 65 Noting that the govern-
denied, 451 U.S. 908 (1982).
63 836 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1987).
64 Id. at 98.
65 Id. at 102. The Second Circuit left open the question whether grossly negligent
or reckless conduct would be sufficient to allege a constitutional violation. Id. at 99. As
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ment owes a duty to protect a person from harm where a special
relationship exists between that person and the state,6 the court
found the "contours of what constitutes a 'special
relationship' ... hazy and indistinct."67 Instead of trying to carve
out such contours, the Second Circuit sidestepped the issue by
concluding that the limited case law in 1981-82, when Barbera
was cooperating with the government, did not clearly establish
that a special relationship had arisen between the government and
Barbera.
68
The circuit courts appear to expect a snowball effect. As
more cases involving special relationships are decided, case law
will expand and the parameters as to when a special relationship
exists will become clearer. Each case will either add an additional
factor necessary in establishing a special relationship or hold that
a particular factor is not relevant. But because courts have repeat-
edly avoided the issue, the snowball rests on dry ground.
What better set of facts than Barbera could a court require to
begin to construct a pliable framework for special relationship
cases? If courts are willing to entertain special relationship argu-
ments, then they should grant special relationship doctrine the
recognition it deserves and rework some of the logic previously
employed to gloss over the issue.
E. Factors for Establishing a Special Relationship
To begin with, courts should not inquire into whether special
relationship doctrine was "clearly established" at the time an indi-
vidual began to have intimate relations with the government. The
words "clearly established"- connote a thing that is securely set
and easily recognizable.69 One logical conclusion is that if no
a result, plaintiffs today should allege recklessness and gross negligence when framing
their complaints.
66 Id. at 101.
67 Id. at 102 (quoting Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986)). Other courts have had similar problems. See,
e.g., Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 721 (1st Cir.) (The Supreme Court of
the United States in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) "gave only vague hints
as to what circumstances, if any, might create such a special relationship and render the
state liable . . . ."), .ert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
68 -Barbera, 836 F.2d at 102.
69 The American Heritage Dictionary defines "clear" as "free from anything that
dims or obscures; easily perceptible, distinct; free from doubt or confusion ... ." THE
AMERICAN HEITAGE DICTIONARY 130 (2d Coll. ed. 1983). It defines "establish" as "to set
securely in a position; to cause to be recognized or accepted .. " Id. at 241. Thus,
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court is willing to begin setting forth precedent on a case-by-case
basis the law will never become clearly established. Each court
would simply look into a void left by the previous court and find
that the state of the law was a seed without soil.
Another problem with the clearly established principle is that
it allows prosecutors, who are assumed to know the state of the
law, to act within the limited bounds of the law even when doing
so is professionally unreasonable. The logic of this is plain. A gov-
ernment employee can only be required to act within the require-
ments of the law and, when the requirements of the law are mini-
mal, the employee has no legal incentive to exercise more than
that minimum degree of care."0 Thus, a minimum degree of
care is exactly what is exercised."
In the context of a prosecutor-witness relationship under the
current state of the law, a federal prosecutor is under no duty to
exercise any minimum degree of care to protect a witness with
whom the prosecutor may have developed a special relation-
ship.72 Should witnesses be forced to cooperate with prosecutors
who have no incentive, other than personal integrity, to provide
protection for their well-being?
On October 12, 1982,7s Congress expressly addressed the
issue when it enacted the Victim and Witness Protection Act of
198271 for the specific purpose "to enhance and protect the nec-
essary role of... witnesses in the criminal justice process...
[and] to ensure that the Federal Government does all that is pos-
sible within limits of available resources to assist ... witnesses of
crime . . ." Congress realized that defendants charged with
something that is clearly established can be defined as something securely set and easily
recognizable.
70 The missing premise is that people generally do only as much as they are re-
quired to by law, if even that much.
71 See, e.g., Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 98- (2d Cir. 1987) and DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1001-02 (1989).
72 See supra notes 61-62. Furthermore, as discussed in this Note, § 1983 creates no
cause of action against a federal employee.
A Bivens action alleging reckless or grossly negligent deprivation of a plaintiff's
fourteenth amendment rights'under the due process clause may be sufficient to find liabili-
ty against a federal prosecutor, but courts have not decided the issue. See supra note 65
and accompanying text.
73 Interestingly enough, Congress enacted the Victim and Witness Protection Act of
1982 just six months after Lena Margaret Barbera's murder.
74 The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L No. 97-291, 96 Stat.
1248 (1982) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1500-15 (1988)).
75 Id. at 1249.
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committing a crime receive more help and protection than do
victims and witnesses of the same crime. 6 Yet, ironically, Con-
gress did not provide for a cause of action when a federal prose-
cutor unreasonably refuses to provide police protection to a wit-
ness who has agreed to cooperate with the government." Hence,
witnesses who experience harm related to their roles as witnesses
are forced to return to the only available cause of action under
section 1983 or Bivens.
Either legislatures or courts need to develop special relation-
ship doctrine so that prosecutors may be subject to personal lia-
* bility if they fail to exercise a minimum degree of care in pro-
tecting vulnerable witnesses."' The absence of liability and lack
of guidelines afford prosecutors indiscriminate latitude to whom
they should grant protection.
Second, as is often the case in a prosecutor-witness relation-
ship,"9 a witness may be at the mercy of the prosecutor. In
76 Id at 1248. Section 2 of the Act provides:
The Congress finds and declares that- (1) Without the cooperation of victims
and witnesses, the criminal justice system would cease to function; yet with few
exceptions these individuals are either ignored by the criminal justice system or
simply used as tools to identify and punish offenders. (2) All too often the vic-
tim of a serious crime is forced to suffer physical, psychological, or financial
hardship first as a result of the criminal act and then as a result of contact
with a criminal justice system unresponsive to the real needs of such victim. (3)
Although the majority of serious crimes falls under the jurisdiction of State and
local law enforcement agencies, the Federal Government, and in particular the
Attorney General, has an important leadership role to assume in ensuring that vic-
tims of crime, whether at the Federal State, or local leve4 are given proper treatment by
agencies administering the criminal justice system. (4) Under current law, law en-
forcement agencies must have cooperation from a victim of crime and yet nei-
ther the agencies nor the legal system can offer adequate protection or assis-
tance when the victim, as a result of such cooperation, is threatened or intimi-
dated. (5) While the defendant is provided with counsel who can explain both
the criminal justice process and the rights of the defendant, the victim or wit-
ness has no counterpart and is usually not even notified when the defendant is
released on bail, the case is dismissed, a plea to a lesser charge is accepted, or
a court date is changed.
Id. (emphasis added).
77 Congress did specify that "[a] victim or witness should routinely receive informa-
tion on steps that law enforcement officers and attorneys for the Government can take
to protect victims and witnesses from intimidation." 18 U.S.C. note (a)(2) prec. § 1513
(1988). This "note" is of little comfort considering the negligible number of witnesses
who actually realize they qualify for police protection.
78 See infra text preceding note 82.
79 Using co-conspirators to testify against their partners in crime enables prosecutors
to gather sufficient evidence to present a case when government-produced evidence is
lacking. Such testimony is so essential to our criminal justice system, federal statutes
1991]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Barbera, the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) secured
Barbera's testimony against her former employer by permitting
her to plead guilty to a single-count information charging her
with fraud. The AUSA's office promised to make no recommen-
dation regarding her sentence." Barbera requested that the
AUSA provide her with police protection on at least two occa-
sions.81 The second request came after another employee of the
company mysteriously disappeared, but, again, the AUSA refused
Barbera's request.12 Barbera was forcibly lodged between a rock
and the AUSA. The choice to testify was certain to place her life
in danger. Barbera's refusal to testify would likely result in the
AUSA bringing more severe charges against her. Her fatal choice
was to testify, and the AUSA remained free of responsibility for
his failure to grant her protection.
Third, because special relationship doctrine is necessarily fact
specific, rarely would a case involving a special relationship clearly
rest within the holding of a previous case. Each case, presenting
its own original fact pattern should be analyzed in its individual
context. Thus, no single factor should carry the day. Rather, the
court should attempt to generate a pliable standard that would
encompass a wide reaching variety of fact patterns.
allow prosecutors to grant witnesses immunity for their testimony that may otherwise
have been protected under the fifth amendment. See 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1988). Nonethe-
less, this only protects witnesses from prosecution in our court system as a result of
their statements. It provides no protection from forces outside the courtroom. Thus,
witnesses may still be forced to choose between being prosecuted themselves or testifying
and endangering their lives. This type of situation is where a prosecutor should be held
to the standard proposed infra at text preceding note 83.
For examples where the witness seems to be at the mercy of the prosecutor, see
Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 553-62 (1980) (holding that the district court
properly considered, as one factor in imposing sentence, the petitioner's refusal to cool>-
erate with officials investigating a criminal conspiracy in which he was a confessed partic-
ipant). See generally United States v. Vargas, 925 F.2d 1260 (10th Cir. 1991) (government
could make a motion to reduce defendant's sentence, if, in its sole and absolute discre-
tion, it determined that the defendant provided substantial assistance); United States v.
Jefferson, Nos. 90-8028, 90-8030 (10th Cir. 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file);
United States v. Magana-Olvera, 917 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1990) (prosecutor told defendant
that in exchange for his cooperation in identifying his drug supplier, defendant "might"
receive lenient treatment on both the pending state robbery charges and upcoming fed-
eral drug charges); Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 1987).
80 Barbera, 836 F.2d at 98.
81 See supra text accompanying note 63.
82 Barbera, 836 F.2d at 98.
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F. A Proposed Standard
One possible standard involves a two-prong analysis. The first
inquiry would be whether a reasonable person in the government
employee's position would know or should have known that he or
she was assuming a "special relationship" with an individual that
would give rise to a special duty of care. A "special relationship"
would be defined as a logical association between a government
agent or agency and one or more known private individuals that
surpasses any common or usual association experienced between
an agent and those known private individuals in the ordinary
course and scope of that agent's employment. If the objective
answer is positive, then the second inquiry would be whether the
government agents were grossly negligent or reckless in perform-
ing any duty the special relationship reasonably bestowed upon
them. 3
Gross negligence should be the basis for liability rather than
negligence. Mere negligence would not afford government em-
ployees sufficient leeway to perform their everyday tasks. Gross
negligence implies a greater state of mind than mere negligence,
a great blunder as opposed to a mere, mistake or oversight. For
example, a gross mistake is a mistake or duty that should be 'no-
ticed with even less than reasonable care. Such a distinction
seems necessary to allow the government to operate without too
many resources spent on guarding against small errors. Further,
the lower standard of gross negligence would not raise as great a
concern of opening the floodgates of litigation as would mere
83 Barbera provides a scenario where courts could apply this standard. The first
inquiry would be whether a reasonable person in Schlessinger's position should have
known that he was assuming a special relationship with Barbera. The court would have
to determine whether Schlessinger's relationship with Barbera surpassed the usual associa-
tion between a prosecutor and witness within the ordinary course and scope of
Schlessinger's position. Because Schlessinger actively sought out and eventually secured
Barbera's cooperation in exchange for a lesser sentence, he had surpassed the usual
association between a prosecutor and a witness. Barbera's requests for police protection
exacerbated their relationship, especially after the unexplained disappearance of her close
colleague, Chin.
To determine whether Schlessinger was grossly negligent in failing to provide police
protection to Barbera, or whether providing such protection was a' duty reasonably be-
stowed upon him by the relationship, a court would have to discover his reasons for
denying her requests, which were not specified in the case. See Barbera, 836 F.2d at 98.
The point is that courts should begin to develop special relationship doctrine by apply-
ing a viable standard and fitting fact patterns to that standard.
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negligence.
III. WHY THE NO-DUTY RULE REMAIS
Scholars have advanced various arguments for retention of
the no-duty rule. Probably the mainstay argument is that erosion
of the no duty-rule will open "the floodgates of litigation" 4 and
result in "staggering potential liability." 5 Economics and efficien-
cy lie at the heart of these concerns. While some commentators
argue that courts may experience a rise in litigation, causing
greater congestion and a slower judicial process, other commenta-
tors suggest that such worries are extremely exaggerated or even
groundless.
8 6
Some writers consider the fear of court congestion as a rea-
son to retain the no-duty rule "[as] not [an] answer, nor [an]
affirmative argument for not changing the law. [It is] simply
avoid[ing] the argument on the merits."" On the other hand,
proponents of abolishing the no-duty rule argue that the financial
burden imposed upon victimized individuals should be spread
throughout society. 8 This argument unfolds into three distinct
categories: loss-bearing, loss-spreading, and loss-avoidance.8 9 Loss-
bearing involves a wholly economic analysis of which party in a
lawsuit can better afford to bear the cost, or put otherwise, has
the deeper pocket. Almost offensive to one's perception of objec-
tive justice, loss-bearing usually rears its head under the guise of
loss-spreading, as the better loss-bearer is usually the better loss-
spreader.
Loss-spreading analysis examines which party in a lawsuit pos-
sesses a wider base upon which financial loss can best be distrib-
uted. o Loss-spreading argues that financial losses by injured wit-
84 See Note, Municipal Tort Liability for Failure to Provide Adequate Police Protection in
New York State, 39 ALB. L REv. 599, 602 (1975).
85 See Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 581, 523, 456 P.2d 376, 381 (1969) (en
banc).
86 See Note, supra note 84, at 602.
87 Id. at 602 n.28 . (quoting Samore, Codling v. Paglia: Comparative Negligence, 38
ALB. L. REv. 18, 19 (1973)).
88 Note, Police Liability for Negligent Failure to Prevent Crime, 94 HARv. L REv. 821,
834 (1981).
89 Loss-bearing, loss-spreading, and loss-avoidance are complex economic concepts.
This Note only briefly discusses the concepts because other authors have addressed them
more extensively. See id. at 833-34.
90 See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 n.39 (1980), rehg de-
nied, 446 U.S. 993 (1980). The Court stated:
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nesses impose a societal cost that should not be borne solely by
the unfortunate few upon whom the injuries fall.91 Loss-spread-
ing must be analyzed in light of each case. For example, if a pros-
ecutor is being sued in an individual capacity,, the prosecutor has
no better loss spreading capacity than the injured witness. On the
other hand, a municipality being sued possesses a superior base
upon which to spread the financial effects of a lawsuit.9 2 Propo-
nents of the loss-spreading analysis often argue that an entity
could purchase insurance to protect itself and its employees
against such liabilities and spread the cost of the insurance over
its customer base.9" Yet this argument is difficult to justify in the
prosecutor-witness context. Simply stating that "between the two
parties, the one who has acted unreasonably ought to pay" is not
sufficient.9 4 For when the law defines unreasonable, and the
prosecutor has not acted unreasonably under that definition, an
innocent witness may still suffer an objectively unreasonable inju-
ry. Nevertheless, by definition, no party has acted unreasonably,
other than the perpetrator, and the innocent witness goes uncom-
pensated.
The soundest economic principle advocating abolition of the
no-duty rule is loss-avoidance. 95 When a witness reasonably re-
quests police protection from a prosecutor, the prosecutor has the
ability to arrange for such protection. Although prosecutors can-
not be expected to ride "shotgun" with witnesses to the court-
[Wjhen it is the local government itself that is responsible for the constitutional
deprivatiori, it is perfectly reasonable to distribute the loss to the public as a
cost of the administration of government, rather than to let the entire burden
fall on the 'injured individual. No longer is individual "blameworthiness" the acid
test of liability; the principle of equitable loss-spreading has joined fault as a
factor in distributing the costs of official misconduct.
Id. at 657.
91 See Note, supra note 88, at 834.
92 States, government agents, and municipalities all may be defendants under §
1983. Nonetheless, a state itself cannot be liable for damages under § 1983 due to the
eleventh amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
93 See Note, supra note 88, at 833.
94 See id. at 834.
95 See generally G. CALABRESI, THE CosTs OF ACCIDENTs 69-73 (1970). See also
Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L REv. 558 (1985) (criticizing tort law
and accident avoidance principles as a deterrent for undesirable conduct). Sugarman
expresses the deterrence model as, "(w]here avoidance hurts less than the sting, [a per-
son] can rationally elect another course of conduct." Id. at 564. Sugarman also contends
that "[p]eople are led to behave properly before they have any personal encounter with
the law." Id.
1991]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
house, they are generally in a better position to prevent injury to
the witness." This is not an unreasonably burdensome task for
prosecutors to perform. To begin with, prosecutors should only
be required to reasonably assess whether they have entered into a
special relationship with a witness that may require them to pro-
vide affirmative protection.97 Second, prosecutors who have dealt
with witnesses to the extent that a "special relationship" exists are
inevitably aware of the facts surrounding the witness's predica-
ment.9" Third, when determining prosecutorial liability, courts
should scrutinize a prosecutor's decision whether to provide po-
lice protection under a gross negligence or reckless standard.99
Finally, in exchange for this minimal effort, both the prosecutor
and society at large receive the witness's effort and cooperation in
fighting crime. Hence, adhering to a loss-avoidance principle is
not only a way to minimize potential harm to specific witnesses,
but also a method to secure witness cooperation.
Another significant policy consideration in favor of retaining
the no-duty rule is that legislatures should mandate any changes
in this area of law, not the courts. °° To truly assess the validity
of this argument, one must look at the underlying societal values
and our government structure. On one hand, Americans generally
share a libertarian disposition-that is, more or less,
"don't tread on me and I won't tread on you."101 On the other
hand, any democracy contains an inherent utilitarian ingredi-
ent-the greatest good for the greatest number. The traditional
function of the judiciary is to vindicate the rights of the individu-
al as each case is brought before the court. The framers of the
United States Constitution believed that the rights of the few, the
minority, would best be served by a countermajoritarian unit that
was not under political influence.0 2 This unit, the federal judi-
96 See supra text accompanying note 63.
97 See supra text preceding note 81 and text accompanying note 83.
98 This Note's suggested standard, supra at text preceding note 83, caters to the
special position of a prosecutor by requiring a relationship that "surpasses any common
or usual association between [a prosecutor] and [a witness]."
99 See supra text preceding note 83.
100 See Note, supra note 84, at 603.
101 Frank Michelman contends that "[a]fter all, the justification of the republic is
freedom, to be found in the process of self-government-not the freedom of rulers as a
class apart (and certainly not that of the Laws) but the freedom of each person as rul-
ing and being ruled." Michelman, Traces of Sey-Governmen4 Foreword to The Supreme Court:
1985 Term, 100 HARV. L REV. 4, 42 (1986) (on civic humanism and the libertarian
strand of American conservatism).
102 The President appoints all article III federal court judges, including Supreme
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ciary, conserves the libertarian rights of the citizens.
Opposite this countermajoritarian branch of government, the
framers designed a legislature that is sensitive to the majority's
needs, through the election process, and best suited to define the
greatest good for the greatest number. The question becomes:
Which branch is best suited to determine the propriety of the no-
duty rule?
Some commentators argue that since "tort law 'traditionally
has been a matter for judicial rather than legislative growth,' any
'[r]ecourse to the legislature ... [can be] condemned as a need-
less abdication of judicial responsibility."" 3 Although "tradition"
is not enough to justify the judicial branch's development of the
no-duty rule or special relationship doctrine, this viewpoint cor-
rectly reflects the notion that the judiciary is best suited to vindi-
cate the rights of individuals, and that the legislature may inter-
vene if necessary. This is not to say that the judiciary should be
legislating or promulgating new law, but, as Judge Keating ob-
served, the no-duty rule is 'Judge made and can be judicially mod-
ified."
104
Yet federal courts apparently feel that the legislature is best
fit tb either abolish the no-duty rule or to expand special relation-
ship doctrine because the courts have failed to attempt either.
0 5
Congress, on the other hand, has either decided that the greatest
good for the greatest number is presently being achieved under
the current law or that the judiciary is best suited to promulgate
Court Justices, for lifetime tenure conditioned only on their "good behavior." They can
be removed only by impeachment or resignation. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
103 See Note, supra note 84, at 603-04 (quoting Comment, Torts - Illegitimacy - Bastard
Has Cause of Action Against State for Negligently Permitting Her Mother's Rape, Causing
Plaintifs Illegitimacy, 41 N.Y.U. L REV. 212 (1966) and Note, Compensation for the
Harmful Effects of Illegitimacj, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 127, 146 (1966)).
104 Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 592, 240 N.E.2d 860, 867, 293
N.Y.S.2d 897, 907 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting).
105 See, e.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988). According to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit:
[i]mplication of a "positive" right (to have the government do something) out of
the constitutional "negative" right (to be let alone) often depends on arguments
about policy rather than on the text, structure, or history of the document it
may depend on seeing things from the perspective of collective benefits rather
than the autonomy of the individual, a perspective that potentially increases the
role of government in society, contrary to the plan of the Bill of Rights. Such a
step therefore must be unusual and exceptionally well-justified.
Id. at 1213.
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any new doctrine." 6 Thus, the no-duty rule generally remains
unchallenged, and the special relationship doctrine remains stag-
nant.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT ON SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS
As much as DeShaney narrows the situations in which a plain-
tiff may bring a cause of action for failure of a government agent
to act, it further narrows the scope of special relationships. The
Supreme Court recognized that in certain limited circumstances
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment imposes a
duty upon the state to take affirmative action to protect certain
individuals." 7 Nonetheless, the Court' rejected DeShaney's con-
tendon that a special relationship could exist between an individu-
al and the State absent some type of custodial relationship.'
Yet the Court may have created a loophole when it noted that
"[w]hile the State may have been aware of the dangers that Josh-
ua faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor
did it do anything to render him more vulnerable to them."'
0 9
The Court may have intended to leave open the issue of
liability where the government played a part in creating the dan-
ger to a known individual but where no custodial relationship
existed." The Court also left open the issue whether a grossly
negligent or reckless unconstitutional deprivation would be suffi-
cient to establish a redressable constitutional claim where a state
did not place the individual in a position of danger. Regardless,
absent any state statute or tort law creating a cause of action for
an injured witness due to a state prosecutor's failure to provide
police protection, the "loophole" may be the only avenue available
for legal redress.
106 See supra notes 61, 62, and 76.
107 DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004-05.
108 Id. at 1005. According to the Court;
[i]n the substantive due process analysis, it is the State's affirmative act of re-
straining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf-through incarcera-
tion, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal protection of the
Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against
harms inflicted by other means.
Id. at 1006.
109 I& at 1006.
110 DeShaney does not answer this question because the state did not create the dan-
ger Joshua suffered from. It would be interesting to see how Barbera would be decided
by exploiting this "loophole."
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court is aware that constitutional tort cases
must strike a balance "between the interests in vindication of
citizens' constitutional rights and in public officials' effective per-
formance of their dudes.""' But even an arm's length analysis
of state "inaction" claims or of a situation where a prosecutor has
failed to 'provide police protection to a needy witness reveals that
neither courts nor legislatures have struck the balance." 2 Out-
side of relevant state statutory law, courts in general refuse to
find that state or federal officials owe a duty to provide protec-
tion to specific individuals."' Due to this restrained view of the
state-citizen relationship and the duty of the State to provide affir-
mative protection to its citizens under the fourteenth amendment,
such actions have generally been unsuccessful." 4 The two-prong
standard articulated in this Note" 5 would impose liability on
government agents if they were grossly negligent in performing
reasonable duties to a known individual if reasonable agents
would have known that they were assuming a special relationship
with that person. Such a standard imposes a duty of reasonable
protection to qualified witnesses while affording sufficient defer-
ence to prosecutorial discretion and decisionmaking.
Daniel J Glivar
111 Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984) (addressing the issue of sovereign
immunity).
112 Cf. Rosen, supra note 2, at 338, 377 (concluding that courts need to balance the
interests between vindication of citizens' constitutional rights and allowing public officials
to effectively perform their duties).
113 30 Proof of Facts, supra note 35, at § 2.
114 S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, § 3.10 (2d ed. 1986
and Supp. 1989) (citing cases at n.171).
115 See supra text preceding note 83.
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